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The purpose of this article is to consider several Spanish thinkers and cultural 
figures of the 1850s who favoured in political thought an emphasis on the individuality 
of persons, and sometimes of events.1 It will look at the relationship between such 
individuality and discussions of alienation, history, and modernity. Finally, the article 
will link the consideration of political thinkers to two cultural figures (Eugenio Lucas 
and Manuel Fernández y González). (Nothing said here is meant to deny the presence of 
anti-individualist intellectuals. See Lacasta Zabalza 1984:8.) The period concerned saw 
the rise of the Democratic Party, founded in 1849 to challenge the two dominant Liberal 
Parties, the right-leaning moderados, and the left-leaning progresistas, both of whom 
had ruled through systems of restricted suffrage. The latter arrangement has been 
termed oligarchic Liberalism. 
It has sometimes been suggested that the emphasis on individuality shared 
across the three political groups indicates the bourgeois origins common to them all. A 
well-established historical view (not just amongst Marxists, but also many of their 
opponents) has it that the nineteenth-century revolutions saw the rise and hegemony of a 
newly dominant class, the bourgeoisie, committed to individual property as the basis of 
the economic and political order. It is implicit in numerous (not all) existing accounts of 
Democratic Party thinkers, especially Pi i Margall, that their ideology (which includes a 
commitment to individualism and to property and rationalism) represents an inability in 
their dispute with the established Liberal Parties and attack on the bourgeoisie to 
transcend the limitations of a bourgeois outlook common to all.2 
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The present article will offer an alternative interpretation of individualism in the 
1850s. It will be argued that there is no core idea of individuality shared by all thinkers. 
For this reason, no single definition of the term individualism will be offered here, other 
than a questioning or significant qualification of the idea that values are rooted in some 
collective reality. In particular, as far as these thinkers are concerned, the latter may 
mean what are described here as collective absolutes: guiding, abstract principles, 
grounded in an Absolute (or for some other reason absolutely guaranteed) and which are 
actualised and shared in the collective life of human society through history. 
The argument presented here is that the emphasis on individuality in the 1850s 
and the questioning or qualification of collective absolutes serve variously to defend 
and attack oligarchic Liberalism, and mean radically different things accordingly. In 
particular, there is a division between two main groups of intellectuals each of which  
has (to a limited extent) a shared aim: the Democrats on the one hand, and, on the other, 
the defenders of the established parties. Individualism is, on this account, a fractured 
concept reflecting the main point of confrontation of established and new political 
forces. 
What is more, a third manifestation of individualism and questioning of 
collective absolutes can be detected in relation to the intellectual disputes of the 1850s. 
In commercial culture (represented here by the novelist Manuel Fernández y González 
and the painter Eugenio Lucas), there is evidence of disconcerting similarities with both 
Democrat and anti-Democrat thought. The effect is to emphasise the importance of a 
perplexing encounter between the work of art and its public, above and beyond any 
secure political and social values.  
A number of caveats should be mentioned. It should be noted that the third 
section of this article in particular is speculative, and rests primarily on parallels 
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between aspects of commercial works and contemporary ideas. It is not my intention, of 
course, to suggest that debates in political philosophy are the sole, exclusive source for 
the paintings and novel discussed or for the ideas seen in them. Whilst, on the whole, I 
seek to provide parallels which fit with specific dates, it is worth noting a number of 
problems with pursuing such an approach too narrowly: the dates of paintings are on 
occasion uncertain, but a broad context may nonetheless be found to explain them; the 
Democratic Party and its programme exist prior to the leftist works discussed here, and 
are responded to earlier than them (for example, by Lafuente); by the same token certain 
Democrat concerns (for instance, radical land reform) pre-exist the specific political 
texts discussed in detail here; and, in general, some sources of leftist ideas circulate 
before they are set down in the specific form discussed in political thinkers here 
(notably, Fourier's thought was known in Spain before Garrido's very particular 
interpretation of it). 
The main body of the article has a tripartite structure corresponding to the three 
conflicting views of individualism and questioning or qualification of collective 
absolutes: Democrat, established Liberal, and that of Lucas and Fernández y González. 
In large part, the analysis provided is its own argument against a shared, core idea of 
individuality. However, it is first necessary to explain a major reason for abandoning an 
interpretation of 1850s thought and culture based on the rise of the bourgeoisie. 
 
The Trouble with the Bourgeoisie 
 
As is obvious, the term bourgeoisie needs to be intellectually viable if it is to be 
the basis of an analysis of anything. There is good reason to question its usefulness. 
Firstly, employing the term bourgeoisie implies a commitment to a particular view of 
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what distinctions are and are not important in identifying groups of people and rival 
parties. For example, considering that the fundamental distinction is that  between 
bourgeois individual property ownership on the one hand, and, on the other, state 
collective control of production and distribution, implies a belief that this is the most 
important of all debates, the major battleground of modern history, within which two 
camps everyone must be grouped. This is not self-evident. 
Secondly, recent historiography has challenged the notion that nineteenth-
century Revolution was the doing of a new class, the bourgeoisie. In identifying instead 
as the protagonists an unstable alliance of very different social groups (from the nobility 
to professionals), historians have doubted the clarity with which bourgeois can be used 
as a referent (Shubert 1990:4-5, 70, 111-16; Cruz 1996:3-15, 257-76; Burdiel 
1999:183). Moreover, Townsend has remarked on the lack of an easy correspondence 
between the Democrat/Republican movement and a social class, and on the need to 
rescue understanding of it from Marxist interpretations that it was bourgeois (1994:3-
29). 
It does not necessarily follow that intellectuals from the unstable, battle-ridden 
groups known as the middle classes did not have a shared idea of individualism. 
However, the following analysis of the distinct positions adopted by intellectuals will 
seek to show how views of individualism fundamentally conflicted with one another, 
and how they primarily relate to a debate over the future of oligarchic Liberalism. 
 
Democrat Individualism 
 
The first stage of the argument will deal with the best studied group, the 
Democrats, reiterating what is known of their main ideas and internal debates, but 
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emphasising the relationship between their view of individuality and their attack on the 
existing parties.  We will look in particular at the Democrat philosophers Pi i Margall 
(on the left of the party) and Castelar (close to the more moderate leadership of Rivero), 
the Socialist thinker Fernando Garrido, and the radical visionary, Roque Barcia. 
Political works discussed will include Pi's La revolución y la reacción (1855), Barcia's 
Catón político (1856), and Castelar's La fórmula del progreso (1858), as well as 
selected writings by Garrido. We will also consider aesthetic and historical views 
expressed in Pi i Margall's Historia de la pintura en España (1851).  
The Democrats supported universal adult suffrage (in many cases, universal 
meant male). However, in the 1850s their leading philosophers did not simply embrace 
national or popular sovereignty, fearing that the simple rule of the majority could 
oppress and exclude. Herein lies the key to their questioning of collective principles as 
the basis of political philosophy. For example, Pi i Margall argues instead that 
sovereignty lay with the individual, and Castelar sees popular sovereignty as a 
secondary principle, subject to the prior and more important rights inherent in the 
existence of the individual. In presenting such arguments, Democrat thinkers 
fundamentally seek to enhance social inclusion: if everyone is individually sovereign, 
no-one can be excluded or oppressed. Their vision of democracy is rights-based: that is 
to say, they hold that the rights of each person cannot be overturned by electoral 
majorities. For Democrat philosophers, individuality is the alternative to a restrictive 
and exclusive social and political environment.3 This is why we hear a fair amount in 
what they say about the underclass, or what were then called the "clases ínfimas": 
prostitutes, beggars, and criminals (Garrido 1859-60 184, 187, 206, 259, Barcia 
1855b:101-02; Pi 1982:126). Even Castelar pointedly remarks that Christ forgave the 
adulterer, the usurer, the prostitute, and the thief, but cast the merchants out of the 
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temple (Castelar 1858:125). More generally, all Democrats appeal to the working 
classes, in broad terminology, which, as befitted the Spanish economy of the time, 
ranges from agricultural and day labourers, to artisans, and industrial workers.4  
If Democrats agreed on individual sovereignty or rights as the means to end 
alienation, their apparently shared conclusions were reached by irreconcilable paths. 
Castro has memorably remarked of the party's various factions that "any cooperation 
was more a response to government pressure than the product of a unity of interests" 
(2000:85). Whilst there is some exaggeration in Castro's comment, it is true that the 
divisions over what individual sovereignty or rights signified indicate fundamental 
splits concerning the society which Democrat philosophers hoped would replace 
oligarchic Liberalism. Conflicting visions of individualism reflect intense debates about 
the remedy for alienation. 
Philosophically, the arguments diverge on key points. Both Pi and Castelar 
could be called existential democrats: they believe that the existence of all individual 
beings must be brought into accord with their essences so that the fulfilment of being is 
realised in history. Both Pi and Castelar argue that democracy requires that each person 
is existentially realised in a way that preserves and expresses their individual rights 
without any alienation at all (voluntary or otherwise) of their essential rights. Beyond 
that point, however, Pi and Castelar differ fundamentally. 
The transcendental idealist Pi is seeking to refute Hegel, by arguing that Spirit 
can only be self-conscious, and thus divine, in the mind of the individual. Pi concludes 
that individuals are, if not God, at least the manifestation of God. He argues for a 
phenomenology beginning with individual consciousness which then understands the 
Universe as divine Spirit, in contrast with Hegel's phenomenology which begins with a 
collective Spirit. Pi consequently believes that all forms of power are repressive of 
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individuals who are the sole legitimate source of knowledge and value. He opposes 
Hegel's belief that the State is the supreme expression of justice, and looks instead to a 
transitional Federal Democracy as a means by which all power will eventually wither 
away (by power, Pi means anything that is not the expression of individual sovereignty). 
Pi's hoped-for future Kingdom of Heaven on earth depends on his claim that matter and 
spirit are one (monism): the unity of these two means that Ideal justice can be 
definitively realised in this world. Pi therefore rejects Proudhon's belief in eternal 
antitheses in the human condition, because they, like Christian dualism, would prevent 
the definitive realisation of individual sovereignty which Pi envisages (Pi 1982:155-56, 
246-53, 282-93).5  
In contrast, Castelar's ontological argument is that being, present in all 
individuals, requires space to manifest itself in existence, which is contingent and 
historical. The State is cast here in an un-Hegelian role as the contingent historical 
arrangement which realises individual essences by protecting their rights, and provides 
the space in which they can exist. Castelar's individualism therefore envisages a 
fundamental, permanent role for the State, which Pi's opposes. What is more, Castelar is 
at odds with Pi's vision of the Kingdom of Heaven on earth, in which definitive 
expression is given to individual sovereignty. Castelar instead argues that the realisation 
of individual essence in existence is an open-ended process requiring multi-party 
democracy and continual changes of government, an endless peaceful revolution. 
Though he could not be further from Proudhon's industrial democracy, Castelar seems 
to take from the French thinker the idea of "series" of theses, antitheses, and syntheses, 
which are never ending, because, he claims, our essential spirit has as its law 
contradiction (Castelar 1858:13-15, 59-64, 82-84).6 Perhaps this fits Castelar's strategic 
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position in trying to woo the parliamentary democrats on the left of the Progressive 
Liberal Party into an alliance (Vilches García 2001:38-39, 45).  
Garrido, in further contrast and in a Socialist tradition, looks to an association of 
all individuals, which will grow in history as a complex being's embryology, but in 
which the uniqueness,  vocation, and autonomy of all must be respected absolutely. In 
Garrido's biological and Fourierist psychological interpretation, history is the struggle 
between the expression of desire and social structure. The aim is to reconcile the two so 
that individual dignity is established, and our desires are no longer alienated by social 
structures which are hostile to them (Garrido 1859-60, 42-43, 193-96, 207-09, 266-68. 
See Aja 1976:189, 244, 252). 
The differences over alternatives to oligarchic Liberalism were not simply 
philosophical. As they endeavoured to describe how alienation and exclusion would be 
ended by individual sovereignty, Democrat thinkers diverged on the degree to which a 
modern economy, society, and culture, should relate to or break with the existing, 
historical legacy. As is well known, differences amongst them concerning economic and 
social change arise from a dispute over whether and how radically to redistribute 
property. In particular, the Democrats differ on how to give every individual economic 
dignity. In the line of the earlier Spanish economist Flórez Estrada as much as of 
Proudhon, both Pi and Barcia stress a need for a new disentailment in opposition even 
to the recent Madoz legislation (1855) so that there is property for all (male) adult 
individuals. Barcia's advocates the redistribution of all land to every cabeza de vecino; 
Pi is in favour of a state-led distribution process (Barcia 1855b:82-86, 99-104; Pi 
1982:387, 419-20).7 If alienation is to end, there must be an immediate and radical break 
with historical patterns of land ownership.  
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The unlikely pairing of Castelar (close to the party leadership) and the 
implacable insurrectionary Garrido (a Socialist in opposition to it who nonetheless 
opposes the redistribution of goods) emphasise other aspects of solutions presented by 
Barcia and Pi: the role of associations and the creation of cheap credit for all. The aim 
here, more than to tear up existing historical patterns of ownership in a radical gesture, 
is to harness the power of the existing economy for all individuals. Thus, Garrido's 
means to property for everyone is share ownership through the establishment of co-
operatives. As well as being what we understand by trades unions, associations and co-
operatives were to be organisations for support in times of unemployment and sickness, 
through mutual insurance schemes. Furthermore (and this is explicit in Garrido and may 
be implicit in Castelar's aim to harmonise trabajo and propiedad) they could be 
intended to emerge as co-operative competitors to and victors over capitalists, cutting 
out the middle man, increasing productivity through the incentive of ownership for all, 
and equating work and value. In Garrido, inspired by French and British Socialism, the 
role of such associations is more widespread still providing, for example, domestic 
support through collective kitchens which supply food more cheaply and productively, 
thus releasing every individual, especially women, to fulfil their potential in all walks of 
life (Castelar 1858:57-58, 93-94, 115; Garrido 1859-60:36-41, 45-46, 101, 299-300).8  
It is at least noteworthy that the two thinkers most committed to radical land 
reform are also the two closest in cultural matters to a modernist rejection of the forms 
of the past. By modernist here, I mean that they favour a culture rigorously concerned 
with the contemporary moment. From 1851 onwards, Pi i Margall's writing, both about 
painting and literature, stressed the alienating effect of reliance on historicist forms 
(particularly history painting) and imitation of the past (even as a kind of national 
rebirth). Pi argues for an art and literature purely of our time, expressing its agonised 
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longing for a future now bereft of religious faith. He claims that the lesson of the great 
artists in history is, paradoxically, always to be contemporary. Pi sees as key examples 
Goya, Larra, and Espronceda (Pi 1851; 1857a; 1857b; see also Arnaldo 1995:299-307). 
For all that he momentarily flirts with a sense of national history, Barcia too looks to a 
new democratic art, born of a political movement that emerged only recently, and that 
will alter painting just as Murillo once had. Barcia's own historical writing underlines 
his desire to break radically with history. He aims to expose the ownership of land as an 
accumulation of usurpations which should be wiped clean. Significantly, he departs 
from conventional Spanish Liberal historicism in viewing even the Reconquista as a 
battle between feudal Lords who on both sides stole the people's land. Not only does 
Barcia attempt to annul the legacy of the past; he considers that apparent national traits 
(like bullfighting) are products of (presently perverse) social structures which are 
merely contingent and can be altered (1855b:82-88, 169-82; 1855a). The most extreme 
modernism comes, however, in the photographic drama, exemplified in Manuel Ortiz de 
Pinedo's Los pobres de Madrid (1857), depicting a contemporary world where 
prosperity is based on false capital and fraud and in which many of the middle classes 
and aristocracy have no wealth because they avoid productive labour.9 We are struck, 
though, less by this underlying meaning and the melodramatic aspects of the plot, than 
by its presentation of the everyday with an air of casual realism that looks forward to 
cinema. Consider, for example, this image of a real street with passers-by and changing 
weather: 
El teatro representa la calle de Alcalá: en primer término la casa de Postas 
peninsulares. Son las diez de la noche: algunos transeúntes atraviesan la escena 
en el momento de levantarse el telón. Nieva ligeramente al concluir el cuadro 
(1922:55). 
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In contrast, Castelar, closer to the Progressive Left, appeals to a national 
aesthetic tradition passing from the Romancero through revolutionary poetry to Rivero's 
vigorous Spanish oratory. For Castelar, then, the past retains its vitality as an inspiration 
for the present struggle against alienation. At the same time, he takes a Schelling-like 
view of art as a glimpse of a synthesis. However, he binds both these concerns to an 
appeal to democracy: by seeing the "pobre hijo del pueblo" as the hero of national 
history, calling on artists to act in associations, and even in the use of kitsch imagery 
("el mal gusto de mis imágenes") to appeal to the oppressed masses (1858:4, 18-19, 24, 
37, 57, 90, 94-95, 114, 117-18, 125-35).10 Whilst more cosmopolitan still than Castelar, 
admitting national feeling only as a sort of bond of proximity, Garrido looks back to 
Socialist Romanticism, expecting the poet and artist to be seers surveying past, present, 
and future. An historicist viewpoint, then, remains central to the artist's understanding 
and expression of the need for change. Like Castelar too, Garrido appeals to popular 
genres, particularly the flexible form of the novel which reaches so much of the 
population. Equally he admires the consolation provided by the spectacle of industry, 
the very image of the future, in which he places such hopes for the eventual liberation of 
manual labour, and whose national achievements he applauds in the form of Monturiol's 
submarine. In this light, Garrido's preference for imaginary literature which takes us out 
of the present day may relate to Socialist Utopian writing (Garrido 1858-59:27-28, 50, 
52-53, 69-74, 322). 
In summary, the Democrats jointly embraced individual sovereignty or rights as 
a remedy for the alienation produced by the exclusive social and political structures of 
oligarchic Liberalism. However, Democrat philosophers could not agree on the 
philosophical basis of their individualism, nor on the political and social forms that it 
should take. Moreover, they differed over the degree to which ending alienation entailed 
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both a fundamental break with history, and the creation of a radically new culture, 
society, and economy.  
 
Anti-Democratic Individualism 
 
Thinkers hostile to the Democratic Party advocated their own versions of 
individualism to a diametrically opposed end: to undermine the Democrats' challenge to 
the existing Liberal Parties. We will look here at four figures: the writer and critic, Juan 
Valera, the similarly employed Pedro Antonio de Alarcón, the Conservative Liberal 
poet and thinker, Ramón de Campoamor, and the journalist-turned-historian, Modesto 
Lafuente, who came from among the progresistas. The writings considered will include 
Lafuente's Historia general de España (particularly its prologue and Discurso 
preliminar of 1852), Campoamor's El Personalismo (1855), Valera's response (in 
articles written between 1857 and 1859) to Castelar's thought, and Alarcón's article 
"Carta a Emilio Castelar" (1858). 
 The clash between the existing and new political forces gives rise to the most 
divergent versions of individualism. In order to understand anti-Democrat 
individualism, it is first necessary to return to the account of alienation and individual 
sovereignty jointly offered by the Democrats, at the heart of which is a Janus-like 
attitude towards collective absolutes.  
All Democrat thinkers insist on association as a fundamental right and as an 
essential instrument of change, and are hostile to such individualist views which (unlike 
their own) are opposed to association.11 Moreover, whilst locating the self-realisation of 
being in the individual, all Democrat thinkers understand such authenticity to be a 
secure value which unites everyone, and which develops through time, whether in the 
 13 
form of the Absolute and its laws of Progress (in Castelar and Pi), or in the growth of 
complex, organic being (Garrido). Hence, in the eyes of Democrat intellectuals, just as 
for earlier leftist thinkers of the 1830s and 1840s, history is akin to a developing 
philosophical argument in which a principle or principles found successive, developing 
expression. Moreover, and again like earlier Progressive Party thinkers, the Democrats 
desired a just structure, arising from a true understanding of the principles of history, to 
replace what they saw as chaos. (By chaos, thinkers did not mean that existing society 
could not be described systematically, but rather that present structures did not 
correspond to just principles.) The Democrats thus continued an earlier leftist tradition 
of radical critique, in the strict sense of going to the root principle structuring society.12 
To that end, the Democrats aim to identify an integrated system of repression favouring 
an oligarchy, which must be replaced by a truly just principle.13 Barcia most eloquently 
describes the Democrat view of alienation: present-day society is run like a monopoly 
("monopolio"): that is to say, it is a restrictive system governed by the few. What is 
required is a disentailment of man ("desamortización del hombre"). Barcia means that 
just as land ownership is bound up in restrictive, unjust provisions, and needs to be 
disentailed, so humanity as a whole should be freed of the unfair structures which bind 
it (Barcia 1855b:50; compare: Pi 1982:384; Garrido 1859-60:31). At the heart of the 
matter is a monstrous State which serves to maintain the system; hence, as Aranguren 
observes, the Democrats' anti-Statism (Aranguren 1965:142) 
The fundamental point of anti-Democratic individualism was to reject the 
radical critique of oligarchic Liberalism and existing society presented by the 
Democrats, and to defend a version of Liberalism rooted in Catholicism. To this end, 
anti-democratic thinkers attacked the persistence among their opponents of the idea of a 
progressive spirit of humanity and a law of history.14 Individual free will and experience 
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(and, in virtually all cases, a related sense of contingency, of the individuality of events) 
are now the alternative to the Democrats' root and branch revolution.  
Valera seeks to sever the spiritual and religious issue from material progress as 
part of his opposition to any law of progress conceived in the line of Transcendental 
Idealism. He mocks the absurdity of dialectical history which, he says, can justify 
anything: it is progress when the French Republic rises, and progress when it falls. 
Valera is in favour of what he terms a more progressive position still than that of leftist 
philosophical history: leaving the material and political destinies of human beings in 
their own hands as a matter of choice. He claims this to be one of the benefits of 
Christianity's separation of the secular and religious. What Valera is explicitly trying to 
do is to attack the view that the Absolute can be realised in history or indeed that any 
progress takes place in the moral sphere. He rejects Democrat attempts to achieve 
equality associated with both those views, claiming that it could be secured only 
through tyranny. Instead, Valera defends inequality between diverse individuals and 
peoples as a necessary incentive to material progress. His political position is reformist 
rather than radical, questioning whether changes to electoral and press laws are 
presently desirable in Spain, claiming that a Democrat-inspired combination of  equality 
and freedom will lead to bigger inequalities, and suggesting that the true aim should be 
to improve the lot of the poor so that at some future date they may have voting rights 
(1949:1407-11, 1418-33; 1966:330). His political stance corresponds with his 
manoeuvring to obtain and retain a seat in parliament and with his oscillations between 
calling himself an independent and a Conservative Liberal.15  
Alarcón does not directly address the arguments of his friend Castelar, and 
admires the latter as a sort of modern prose poet of history, but he rejects the relevance 
of philosophical history to his experience of time as an individual: "Yo, en fin, no tengo 
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nada que ver con las ideas que presiden a tu obra". Unconvinced by the reassurance 
provided by collective absolutes, he is simply not taken by the notion that history is 
"como un poema con unidad de acción". Horrified by the repressive past, worried by the 
future, disturbed by the present, Alarcón argues for a Catholic position in which life is 
filled with uncertainty and the human condition is fallen. All we experience as 
individuals is the anxiety of the present moment: he tells Castelar, "no me curas de mi 
mortal tristeza" (1954a:1778, 1780). Alarcón's insistence on his individual experience of 
fallen humanity corresponds with his attack on Ortiz de Pinedo's Los pobres de Madrid 
for suggesting remedies could be found for all ills, and for ignoring the necessity of 
inequality. In his review of that play, Alarcón, like Valera, argues for the virtues of 
present-day Spanish society claiming, against the Democrat view, that it was already 
meritocratic (1954b:1781-82). 
Campoamor instead offers a much more systematic opposition to the left, in an 
attempt to deny the entire basis of modern philosophy, indeed all existing philosophy 
(he sees himself as inaugurating a new age of thought and truth). The Conservative 
Liberal thinker aims to replace those philosophies which chimerically seek first causes 
and ultimate explanations. Instead, he presents us with a synthetic account of 
experience. A true understanding of the latter, in Campoamor's view, is grounded in the 
fact of religious faith which cannot and should not be philosophically demonstrated 
("porque sí", as his mother put it). With unusual insight, the one favourable thing he 
says about Hegel is that the German does not attempt to provide arguments for why the 
Absolute is.16 Campoamor follows suit. (1855:5-24, 31). 
At the heart of Campoamor's vision is individual human personality. He states 
that God, separate from the creation, lets the spiritual develop in the physics and 
biology of the universe, which are driven by erotic urges, until it becomes the human 
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person. The universe, as he puts it, disintegrates rather than integrates, becoming 
progressively more individual, until the person breaks with matter and goes off to the 
after-life (1855:13, 24-29, 36, 41-47, 52, 60-61, 65). The consequent individuation and 
diversity of the human race is Campoamor's primary justification for his own 
idiosyncratic political actions (it provides a sort of metaphysics of his independent 
stance since the mid-1840s). His philosophical outlook also provides a rationale for his 
belief that to treat people justly is not to treat them equally, but rather differently, 
according to their condition. Moreover, Campoamor's individualism in his metaphysics 
corresponds with a marked anti-Statism in much of his politics. However, his political 
anti-Statism should not be likened to that of the Democrats. He spends significant 
passages of El Personalismo attacking not just the State but also leftist individualist 
versions of Hegelianism (the latter he sees as debased and materialist). The whole thrust 
of Campoamor's defence of the diversity of individuals and peoples is an assault on the 
Democrat idea of equality: Campoamor says that all races are distinct, denies the 
possibility of fertile mestizaje, and establishes a clear hierarchy of races and classes, in 
which all should reach the limits of their merits. What is more, Campoamor is clearly 
defending the record of the reformist moderado state in which he participated as a 
Provincial Governor, and which the Democrats are attacking. Campoamor advocates a 
supposedly meritocratic oligarchy (or, as he puts it, an aristocracy acting in democratic 
interests). That is the point of highlighting what he calls his democratic measures, like 
public works and extending education provision. He specifically mentions his own 
appointment by Sartorius earlier in 1847 (who in 1854 was deeply involved in the 
scandals surrounding railway concessions and the Queen Mothers's disposal of Royal 
possessions). The rejection of the State and the collective idea of Humanity, for 
Campoamor, must mean primarily opposition to the use of the State for levelling social 
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and racial divisions, and for equal treatment of all. The oligarchic reformist state 
concentrating power in the hands of an intelligent elite delivering beneficial laws is a 
good for Campoamor who speaks of blending aristocratic theory and democratic 
practice (1855:65-89, 113-14, 137-39, 158-68, 276, 309-28, 334-39, 349, 371).17  
Lafuente's position is perhaps the most interesting of all the Catholic Liberals 
considered here. His magnum opus Historia general de España was published in 30 
thick volumes from the early 1850s to the late 1860s.18 Its monumental size is 
emblematic of its significance as a symbol of national consciousness. What is more, as 
well as explicitly setting out to explain the existence of the Spanish nation, the work 
aims to provide historical information on the causes of contemporary problems to aid 
government in their present-day decisions, a task that had been more modestly 
attempted by earlier Liberal historians (1852:v, vii-ix; see Moreno Alonso 1979:162-80, 
551-533). In his recent, influential study of Spanish nationalism, Mater Dolorosa, 
Álvarez Junco sees Lafuente's work as typical of the Liberal creation and projection of a 
national consciousness for present-day political ends into a pre-nineteenth-century past 
(2001:201-04). Lafuente thus speaks of the battle of Sagunto as if it had anything to do 
with modern Spain, and modern events like the battle of Zaragoza against Napoleon are 
seen as echoes of such older occasions. Indeed, Lafuente identifies a transhistorical 
national character dating back to pre-history (Lafuente 1861:41-42, 154-55). What is 
perhaps more significant, however, is how Lafuente seeks to reconcile two potentially 
divergent concerns. On the one hand, he is presenting us with an account of how Spain 
and Liberal Nationalism were necessary outcomes of history. In that respect, Lafuente 
looks to reassuring collective, national values which underlie and guide the path of 
historical progress. On the other hand, his historicist vision highlights the violent 
vicissitudes of the Iberian peninsula, and Lafuente describes the danger that contingent 
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history, individual events, and diverse interests will prevent the emergence of Spain and 
Liberal Nationalism.  
Lafuente underlines the fragmentation and tensions between centre and localities 
which render problematic the emergence of any unitary state. He makes clear too the 
difficulties presented by the creation of a modern Liberal state. The individuality of 
localities, events, even persons has to be reconciled with the collective development of 
Spain. Lafuente seeks to address the problem by writing a history which is as much 
about the construction of a nation as about its eternal being. So, he aims to tell us "cómo 
se fue formando en lo material y en lo político esto que hoy constituye la monarquía 
española" (1861:10). He repeatedly uses the verbs aprender, amalgamar, and fundir, 
even in the context of later "races", such as the Goths, mixing with the earlier Spaniards, 
who had already blended with the Romans (1861:13-14, 33). The story of the 
emergence of Liberal Spain is about the problem of bringing together diverse interests, 
principles, and peoples: "amalgamar y fundir elementos y poderes que se habían creído 
incompatibles" so as to have "una organización en que entran todas las pretensiones 
razonables y todos los derechos justos" (1861:13-14). Although Lafuente claims his 
history is written at a distance from politics, the amalgamation and balancing act 
required correspond to political values from the centre of the Progressive Party: hostility 
to the exaltados, a desire to balance devolution to the municipalities with the central 
state, a defence of hereditary constitutional monarchy, an admiration for the 1837 
Consitution (which curtailed the electorate), a vaguely positive reference to "ideas 
democráticas", and the importance of the Catholic faith combined with opposition to 
excessive clerical and Papal power (1861:25, 36-37, 39, 60, 145, 163, 173, 180). 
The balancing act is based not least on Lafuente's historiographical outlook.  
Lafuente explicitly draws both on Hegel's collective analysis, and Barante's description 
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of individuals, combining elements of the two. The Spanish historian thereby opens a 
space not just for individual action within a broad scheme, but also for matters which 
defy any law identifiable by humans (what we might see as contingency): victory at 
Covadonga is improbable; the monarchy's support of Liberalism in the 1830s a surprise 
(1852:xxix, xxxii; 1861:5-6, 43, 168). The history he writes consequently lacks the 
robust framework provided by the Democrats' historical laws. In Lafuente's version of 
history, Progress is a delicate matter, driven by a complex combination of individual 
persons and events, and general trends; of local divergence, and central convergence. 
At the heart of matters is the doctrine of Providence, which substantially 
accounts for Lafuente's slightly antique enthusiasm for Vico and Bossuet (1861:6). 
Providence provides a guarantee of the outcome of Liberal nationalism, whilst at the 
same time acknowledging (not least in encouragement of political prudence) the 
delicacy and contingency of historical processes. Providence is, after all, mysterious and 
allows for free individual action. This is clear even in Lafuente's Providential account of 
Iberian geography, which, cutting it off from the rest of Europe destines it to be a 
nation, but which contains within itself the seeds of division:  
Pueblo siempre uno y múltiple, como su estructura geográfica, y cuya particular 
organización hace sobremanera complicada su historia, y no parecida a la de otra 
nación alguna (1861:10-12). 
Lafuente has taken the established idea of tracing the emergence of a Liberal 
nation and showing the historical lessons to be drawn from it, and projected it on a 
grand scale. However, he attempts to combine such an approach with warnings of the 
unstable course of history, because he is opposed to those he calls los fogosos (fiery 
radicals) and to the belief that there are laws of history (1852:vi, xxxii). As Álvarez 
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Junco notes, Lafuente advocates prudence in the face of the vicissitudes of history 
(2001:207). 
Towards the end of the Discurso preliminar, it becomes apparent that Lafuente's 
rejection of leftist philosophical history implies something more than a need to 
amalgamate and balance the various elements involved in Spain's development. 
Lafuente tells us that the lack of clarity about the precise direction of events means that 
the significance of the present is cloudy, and the past makes sense only in retrospect. 
More than direct lessons, the past provides only the consolation of observing the course 
of Providence amid previous ills. In turn, the present (like any past moment when it was 
lived) allows only for doing the best that we can as individuals without really knowing 
the truth of what is happening:  
Miremos, pues, a lo pasado para no afligirnos tanto por lo presente, y por la 
contemplación de lo pasado y de lo presente aprendemos a esperar en lo futuro, 
sin dejar por eso de aplicar nuestros esfuerzos individuales para mejorar lo que 
existe. Ni juzgamos tampoco por un breve período de cortos años de la 
fisionomía social y de la índole de la época o de un siglo (1861:181-82). 
The Historia general de España has been seen as a monumental explanatory 
account of Liberal nationhood. However, it can equally be seen as an attempt to move 
away from the clarity and certainties of earlier, smaller historiographical efforts, in a 
response to pressure on the centre of the Progressive Liberals from the left and the new 
Democrats which was increasingly dividing the progresistas, even before the hey-day 
of Pi, Castelar, and Barcia after 1854.19 For Lafuente, the individuality of persons and 
events obscures the clarity of direction of history, and mitigates against the idea of a 
radical critique of society and history. 
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In summary, Catholic Liberals sought to reject Democrat ideas by attacking the 
notion that there were laws of history (or that they mattered). By stressing the 
individuality of persons, and often of events, anti-democratic thinkers hoped to 
undermine the Democrat thinkers' radical critique of the present-day and of history. It 
can, therefore, be seen that, in the thought of the 1850s, individualism and the 
questioning of collective absolutes took two directly opposed forms, one of which 
aimed to defend, the other to undermine oligarchic Liberalism and the existing Liberal 
parties.  
 
The Pandemonium Gaze 
 
The final part of this article will examine a third major questioning of collective 
absolutes, which sits only uneasily with the previous two. In the commercial novel El 
cocinero de su Majestad (1857) by Manuel Fernández y González and in the paintings 
of Eugenio Lucas, one sees similarities with both Democrat and anti-Democrat 
thought.20 On the one hand, there are discussions and images of alienation by perverse 
social structures, which closely parallel Democrat accounts of individual sovereignty. 
On the other hand, there is an intense awareness of historical confusion and possibilism 
more typical of Progressives and Moderates, which serves to undermine the secure 
values of collective absolutes even as they are re-imagined by the Democrats..  
In Lucas, similarities with Democrat ideas are to be seen in iconographic images 
of presently alienated and excluded individuals in positions of sovereignty: in El 
cazador we see a poacher in the stance of a Habsburg King; in El santero del Escorial 
(?1862) we are presented with a recreation of a Ribera Magdalen showing a beggar, and 
(by implication, since she is a Magdalen) a prostitute, portrayed not just as a Saint, but 
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in the habitual guise of mournful Mother Spain accompanied, as was usual, by the hijos 
de España.21 What matters here, of course, is not that the underclass or outlaws are 
being presented in a potentially positive light (a Romantic topos), but that they are being 
displayed as the symbols of political and national legitimacy. What is more, Garrido 
warned the ruling elite that they would be confronted by the spectre of criminality, and 
said that the prostitute was emblematic of nineteenth-century life (1859-60:30-31). 
Lucas's large-scale representations of individuals from the underclass taking up the 
posture of sovereignty might be interpreted as the fulfilment of such warnings about the 
consequences of the alienating structures of oligarchic Liberalism. Other Lucas images 
reinforce the impression of Democrat influence on his work, sometimes in such obvious 
ways as his producing an Alegoría de la República guiando a España, dedicated to his 
friend, the constructor Ángel Pozas.  
In Fernández y González's novel in turn, there is a striking intellectual parallel to 
Democrat theories of personal self-realisation and alienation. In a key passage, Quevedo 
reveals to another character (Dorotea) his inner self, which he conceals from everyone 
else: "vais a ver lo que nadie ha visto; vais a oír al hombre" (195). What Quevedo tells 
Dorotea is that he is an alienated individual. He does so in striking terms: "mi vida 
necesita espacio donde extenderse, y no le halla, mi vida está comprimida" (196). 
Clearly, the character's remark is in part an extension of broader Romantic (and earlier) 
trends concerning the frustration of desire by social structures. However, Fernández y 
González's phrasing has some specific and more significant characteristics. Quevedo 
speaks of having an inner and essential life or being ("mi vida") which requires and is 
clearly distinct from an "espacio" into which it must expand. The space in question is 
social and historical existence. Since inner being cannot be expressed in existence in the 
present state of affairs, it is compressed and constrained. What is more, the expression 
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of the individual's essential life and desire is portrayed in Quevedo's remark as the sole 
true basis of legitimation: there is no question here of desirable compromise with social 
structures, voluntary alienation, or a higher collective principle. Rather social structures 
must adapt to the fulfilling expression of the individual's inner self. There are significant 
parallels between the turn of thought here and the existentialist turn of mind proper to 
the Democrat account of alienation, in which individual essential being or desire must 
find its complete realisation and plenitude in (historical) existence or be doomed to 
unjust frustration. Indeed, given the importance of characters' sexual feelings 
throughout the novel (for which, see below), it is not impossible that the specific 
Democract influence here is the Fourierist account of history in which desire had to be 
reconciled with social structure.  
Whilst both Lucas and Fernández y González allude to Democrat ideas about 
alienation, neither seems to embrace Pi's radical view that a rigorously contemporary 
culture must be developed in order to extirpate Spain's oppressive historical legacy. 
Both Lucas and Fernández y González were engaged much of the time in the 
enlargement of the market for national historical consciousness.22 It is true that many, 
probably most of Lucas's paintings do refer to contemporary issues, or at least matters 
since 1808, and that he is closely associated with Pi's beloved Goya. However, Lucas's 
deliberate re-creation of Goyesque (and other) works, including now anachronistic 
Inquisition scenes, is at odds with Pi's linking of modernity to sincere self-expression 
and opposition to imitation. Lucas's very idea of painterly identity, intimately related to 
the emulation of other painters, or at the very least established genres, is at odds with 
Pi's view of the individual self. So are his national historicist echoes of the past in the 
present (Ribera's Magdalen appearing as a beggar-prostitute in El santero del Escorial, 
for example).23 
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More significantly still, there is a basic difference which seems to distinguish 
Fernández y González and Lucas even from the more historicist Democrats, like 
Castelar. As we have seen, the central Democrat ideas of alienation and individual 
sovereignty require a turning away from distorted historical structures towards an 
Absolute, or a radical principle. This is true even of Castelar's view that human life is 
always open-ended and changing. Fernández y González and Lucas tend not to offer 
such a clear possibility of radical change, and this fact seems to place them rather with 
the anti-Democrat individualists. At the same time, the allusions to Democrat ideas 
about alienation and individual sovereignty remain in a way which is clearly at odds 
with the Catholic Liberal position.  
One can see the problem with alienation in Fernández y González's depiction of 
Quevedo. Unable to express his inner being in the contingent, historical circumstances 
which surround him, the writer dedicates his life to a masquerade in which his inner self 
is concealed from view, and in which he manipulates external circumstances. The 
conceptista language and humour which he habitually deploys is described as a 
"lenguaje artificial" (268). Quevedo describes himself as "este pobre Quevedo en que 
todos ven lo que él quiere que vean" (195). It is his masquerade, jesting, and artificial 
language which allow him to negotiate the perilous world of the Court, as the bufón 
perceives: "vos sois el bufón de todos por estafeta [...] vos os aprovecháis de las risas de 
todos que son vuestra mejor espada" (58). The court jester proceeds to remark that the 
real joke is understood only be the few who can perceive his and Quevedo's 
manipulation of external appearances: "¡Oh, si alguna vez llegamos al fin de nuestro 
camino, juro a Dios que no han de reírse más de cuatro con los desenfados del poeta y 
con las desvergüenzas del bufón!" (58). 
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What is significant here is not just that Quevedo is portrayed at odds with 
Spain's government, nor that he is shown to be a clever manipulator of language, gifted 
with remarkable insight. Quevedo was frequently portrayed in precisely those terms in 
mid-nineteenth-century drama. Notable amongst relevant plays are Florentino Sanz's 
then celebrated Don Francisco de Quevedo (1848), and the two parts of Patricio de la 
Escosura's La Corte del Buen Retiro (1837-44). Such representations of Quevedo with 
his spectacles, a symbol of insight, involved in conspiracies against tyrannical 
favourites, seem intended to echo characteristic sentiments of Liberal historiography, 
not least of which was Durán's earlier thought that Golden-Age literature was the swan-
song of a medieval Liberalism in an Absolutist age; Quevedo's life can be seen as a last 
gasp of national liberty (Gies 1975; Ginger 1999:129-41). In the theatrical works 
mentioned, Quevedo was habitually depicted outwitting his political enemies and 
securing the triumph of the good. His troubles (as in the most famous play, by Sanz) 
tended rather to concern his difficulties in reconciling his private happiness with the 
public good. 
Where Fernández y González most strikingly contrasts with such precedents is 
in the fundamentally perplexing nature of his Quevedo. The latter is so deeply alienated 
by his external circumstances, that he all but renounces the direct expression of his inner 
being in favour of an obsessive desire for power and control, reminiscent of Romantic 
Satanism. Quevedo tells his beloved Catalina, "yo necesito dominar, dominarlo todo, 
porque desprecio todo lo que me rodea, todo menos a ti, que eres mi mujer como yo tu 
hombre.... ¿entiendes? Hay en mí algo rebelde, algo de Satanás" (268). Even the 
qualification here, his love for the married woman Catalina, is at one stage 
compromised when he sees her as just a potential obstacle in his path: "Quevedo vio de 
un golpe que doña Catalina podía ser el obstáculo perenne de su vida." (268). At the 
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heart of the problem in El cocinero de su Majestad is Quevedo's ethical behaviour. In 
particular, what is at stake is the cold moral pragmatism with which the writer attempts 
to control and direct the society that alienates him, favouring a Machiavellan vision of 
life: "Cuando median altos intereses, todo se atropella" (103).  
Quevedo is involved in a struggle with the court favourite Duke of Lerma who is 
seen as instrumental in the decline of Spain under the Habsburgs (11). In pursuit of his 
political aims, Quevedo persuades Juan, who is in love with a woman at court, to seduce 
the prostitute Dorotea, herself involved in a ménage à trois which includes Lerma. The 
results are a partial political success, but an ethical disaster, as Juan ends up torn 
between his intense sexual relationship with Dorotea and his love for his wife-to-be. In 
turn, Dorotea is destroyed by the discovery of love in her virginal soul (resident in a 
body that, as she says, is anything but) which ties her to Juan who is marrying someone 
else. It all ends with Dorotea committing suicide, and Juan, having previously suggested 
keeping her as a mistress, diving on her body to kiss her, only to be led away by 
Quevedo who, having failed to direct Dorotea into a more calm course of action, 
persuades Juan to return to his fiancée by slandering the dead, and in this case innocent, 
Dorotea (79, 102, 121-22, 147, 154, 278-85). 
Quevedo justifies all his actions on the grounds of necessity: "Necesaria ha sido, 
y con decir que ha sido necesaria, digo que ha sido justa" (287). The narrator further 
disturbs us by appearing to agree, saying that since Dorotea is now dead her non-
existent feelings cannot count towards our evaluation of the outcome (287-88). There 
are some efforts to present matters in a more palatable way: Quevedo attempts at one 
stage to guide Dorotea into a path of virtuous suffering, and the reader is offered 
occasional reassurance that the experience of true love outweighs the sexual 
promiscuity of the various characters (Quevedo tells Catalina, "Helos tenido con 
 27 
muchas hembras, pero tratándose de mujeres, sois mi primera mujer"). However such 
palliatives are seriously undercut by the ending because of Dorotea and Juan's 
behaviour (94, 155, 196, 278-79). Moreover, the established role of Quevedo in 
theatrical depictions as politically triumphant and restoring order to Court is replaced by 
his refusal to take any further part in guiding the monarchy (he thinks it futile) and his 
preference for living in Naples with his married lover (286-88). The narrator tells us: 
"La situación de la corte había quedado en el mismo estado que antes; las intrigas 
seguían, los que antes eran enemigos, seguían profesándose un razonable odio" (288). 
In Fernández y González's version, Quevedo ostensibly seeks justice by cruelly 
manipulating people (and particularly their feelings of love and sexual desire) to the 
point of psychologically destroying them, and considers a reasonable means to an end 
lies and distortion at the expense of those with the best of intentions. By the end, he has 
succeeded in changing little of political substance, and he has failed to save Dorotea. 
The reader is left torn between the unhappy alternative of finding the narrator's 
apparently approving comments provocatively glib, or supposing them to represent the 
sort of hard-headed moral realism that underlies Quevedo's behaviour. The reader is 
divided too between a suggestion that, perhaps, after all, and when everything is taken 
into account, and however unpalatable it might see, the ending is a reasonable enough 
outcome, and the sense that the Quevedo's actions are utterly reprehensible and do little 
to benefit the wider good. 
The core of Fernández y González's troubling depiction of Quevedo is a 
description early on in El cocinero de su Majestad. It is here that the nineteenth-century 
novelist speaks of a pandemonium gaze. Quevedo's gaze is said to be fundamentally 
enigmatic, perturbing, difficult to interpret; he is depicted as someone whose intelligent, 
piercing gaze resists easy interpretation (it is a mirada pandemónium expressing 
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diverse, irreconcilable feelings). The rest of the novel can be seen as providing an 
explanation of the morally ambiguous behaviour of Quevedo, and the impression he 
gives of penetrating (even frightening) insight. Quevedo, we are told, had  
dos grandes ojos negros, de mirada fija, chispeante, burlona y grave a un tiempo, 
inteligente, altiva, picaresca, desvergonzada, escrudriñadora: mirada que se reía, 
mirada que suspiraba, mirada pandemónium si nos permite esta frase, a cuyo 
contacto se encogía el alma de quien era mirado por ella, temerosa de ser 
adivinada o de ser lastimada (20). 
As we have seen, these characteristics arise from his profound alienation and are means 
of dealing with his external circumstances. The resulting ambiguity is underlined by 
subsequent reference to Quevedo as someone "a quien no comprendemos tal vez", and 
as "esa colosal figura, colocada la mitad en luz, la mitad en sombra" (20). As we know 
from the rest of the work, Quevedo's life is portrayed as a kind of morally ambiguous 
masquerade.  
For the purposes of comparison with Lucas's paintings, what is most significant 
here is the way that the mirada pandemonium deals with alienation. Rather than 
directing us to secure values, it presents us with an enigmatic spectacle, rooted in 
historical existence, whose (partly comic) sense is deeply ambiguous and perturbing.  
There are striking parallels between important aspects of Fernández y 
González's description of Quevedo's gaze and Lucas's own self-portraiture. Whilst it 
would be wrong to suggest that Lucas and Fernández y González's Quevedo are 
lookalikes (they are not), both stare out at us, challenging us enigmatically, quizzically, 
even ironically, examining the onlooker, rather than revealing their inner life or 
thoughts. Lucas even appears as a dwarfish bufón in some of his political paintings 
(notably, La alegoría de la República guiando a España). The unsettling effect of 
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Lucas's gaze has its parallel in a number of paintings where (just as in Fernández y 
González) the historicity of existence is used to confront the viewer disconcertingly, 
rather than or more than to provide secure collective values. The tragicomic image of 
Velázquez's beggar-philosopher Aesop intrudes as an unsettling historicism in the 
middle of the contemporary opening of the waters from Lozoya (1858); there is an 
almost angry, certainly perturbed response to our presence in Fantasía sobre las 
meninas.24 Lucas's La Revolución is indicative of his problematic vision: the mass of a 
popular movement is conjured up in large scale, fresco-like figures, swirling towards us 
in a curve that recalls Goya or Bosch (then thought to have been resident in Spain, and 
thus a legitimate element of national historicism), presenting at the centre (as in 
Lafuente's account of the 1808 uprising) a parallel religious and political revolutionary 
figure, leaving us uncertain whether we are to be welcomed or lynched (Madrazo 
1854:107; Lafuente 1861:155-56). We perceive, not reassuring (revolutionary) 
collective values, but rather an unsettling image of history. Among several scenes of the 
War of Independence, which gaze out challenging the viewer with the horrors of history 
that the patriotic struggle implied, the strangest is perhaps El fusilamiento (1862). Here 
Goya's Tres de mayo is reworked so that the central, Christ-like figure seems now to be 
performing as much as suffering, and the people around him, now turned to face us, are 
caught somewhere between preparing nobly for martyrdom and cowering in fear (one of 
them may even be biting his nails). Tragicomedy takes the place of edifying national 
martyrdom. 
Lying behind several of these paintings is tension and confusion between the 
realities of historical existence, and a sense of the alienation of the pueblo and the Ideal 
values that implied in Democrat thought about individual sovereignty. In line with this 
thought, Lucas, partly looking to Alenza's paintings and drawings of the 1830s and 
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1840s, conjures up in La extremaunción (?1855-56) an unsentimentalised vision of the 
lower classes that recognizes their suffering in a way reminiscent of the Democrats' 
sense of popular corruption by structural perversions of society.25 However, the painting 
does not provide quite the same clarity of meaning as is found in political thinkers. The 
gestures of the poor at the dying man's side would seem to invite melodramatic 
compassion of a type familiar from leftist popular literature; but the presentation which, 
as in Alenza, hovers nervously between realism and the grotesque, the fragmented, 
sketchy depiction, and thick, sculpted lumps of impasto which constitute their broken 
forms, serve to lend a distance to the scene by impeding identification with the events. 
The central aura around the priest in this context aims less to affirm the role of the 
Church than it does to make us wonder, in the line of some Democrat thought, about the 
relationship between Catholic devotion and popular suffering, without, though, any 
terribly clear conclusions. In Fiesta en la Muñoza (?1852-53), Lucas seems to evoke the 
other side of the coin, the Ideal, in the partly Fourierist tradition of stylised, fresco-like 
rural images of utopian felicity, but situates it historically in costumbrista Spain, and in 
recent artistic tradition by blending the posed images of some artists (like Manuel 
Castellano), with a backdrop of bull farming clearly resembling those of the Granadine 
painter, José Elbo.26 We might be led to suppose the painting celebrates the harmony of 
social classes found not in utopia but in Spanish historical existence. However, the 
individuation of the figures, and the complex, often sexual interaction between them, 
helps to fragment the image and divert our gaze in multiple directions such that, again 
in parallel with Alenza's compositions, we have a sense more of complexity than of 
simple resolution. The young lady seated to the left ignores her mother's request to play 
the guitar, and instead looks out shamelessly. Lucas thus typically exaggerates the 
fashion of Andalusian commercial paintings which often depicted prostitutes, and 
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sometimes other women, in a similar way so as to provide gentlemen with a salacious 
pleasure.27 Moreover, the gestures of some of the lower-class figures to the sides 
suggest either their ill-ease or a potential danger presented by them: the woman standing 
to the left makes a gesture, seen in some of Goya's Caprichos, which would appear 
either pejoratively to refer to masturbation, or to indicate that she is about to punch the 
man beside her. The painting as a whole thus arguably relates to Fourierist psychology 
in its troubled relationship between the expression of desire and social structure.  
Doubtless the ambiguities of these paintings helped make them acceptable to a 
diverse commercial audience who could see them in different ways. However, that in 
itself, with the patterns of recreations, the evident construction of the image through his 
characteristic impasto, the challenging vision, reminds us of the problematic sense of 
existence (rather than essence) of Fernández y González's mirada pandemónium. 
Indeed, the lives of both Lucas and Fernández y González help explain their peculiar 
stance. Lucas, for example, was reliant on wealthy buyers of various political 
persuasions, and worked at the Royal Court, even as he fought in the 1854 Revolution 
and painted satires of the Royal family. He was therefore in a good position to observe 
the difficulty of reconciling a sense of alienation with the circumstances of his 
existence. The willingness of both Lucas and Fernández y González to explore 
transgressions of family and other moral values may also find some explanation in their 
lives. Lucas, living in an extramatrimonial relationship, having abandoned his wife, 
falsifying census returns, and possibly implicated in a major case of forgery, was in an 
enviable position to explore such a dimension, as indeed was Fernández y González, 
purveyor, quite literally, of cheap thrills which made him rich, and led him into a life of 
opulence that was to end in alcoholism and the loss of his eyesight.28 
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The pandemonium gaze of Fernández y González and Lucas incorporates a 
profound sense of alienation, influenced by Democrat individualism. However, it 
acknowledges the overwhelming force of contingent historical circumstances 
(existence) which must be addressed, and which undermines any secure collective 
absolute in a way more typical of oligarchic Liberal thought. Instead of looking 
fundamentally to the absolute, essential values of Democrat individual sovereignty, the 
commercial writer and artist preferred to present their public with a perturbing, 
enigmatic experience of existence in history. 
 
Conclusion 
Individualism was a fractured and disputed concept, used to a variety of 
incompatible ends in the battle over the future of oligarchic Liberalism. The questioning 
of collective absolutes did not express the underlying, but ultimately unified ideology of 
a newly dominant social class (the bourgeoisie). Rather, we have seen it take three 
(internally divided forms): the Democrat idea of individual rights and sovereignty as the 
basis of a radical social, political, and cultural critique; the Progressive and Moderate 
idea of individual free-will and contingent historicity as the basis of a rejection of that 
radical critique; and the enigmatic stance of Fernández y González and Lucas in 
commercial culture, placed ambiguously between the two sides, echoing both the 
Democrat sense of alienation, and yet also the imposing and perturbing reality of 
historical existence. 
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the labrador (1858:57), Jesus as the son of an artisan (1858:123), and the first hero of Spanish history as 
a pastor (1858:128). Labrador may mean tenant farmer (Shubert 1990:71). Barcia calls Christ a 
jornalero (1855b:64). He also refers to life in pueblos, the pastor, and to poverty in Galicia and Andalusia 
(1855b:76-77, 148-49, 143). Pi discusses industrial pauperism, industrial conflict in Catalonia, famine in 
Galicia, the fate of jornaleros, and mass rural poverty (1982:149-50, 185, 270, 273). Garrido ranges from 
farmworkers, through artisans, to industrial workers (1859-60:315-17). See also Castro 2001:82; Aja 
1976:158-59; Jutglar 1975:46. 
5 There are numerous good accounts of this philosophical dimension of Pi's thought: see Lacasta Zabalza 
1984:246-54; García Casanova 1982:91, 111-14, 225-30, 245-53; Trujillo 1967:92-125; Jutglar 
1975:163-89, 202-05; Abellán 1979-84:582-99. 
6 On Castelar see García Casanova 1982:94-96, 207-16; Lacasta Zabalza 1984:259-68 (though I take 
Castelar's transcendental idealism more seriously than the latter who sees the Hegelianism as 
ornamental); Abellán 1979-84:573-77. On Proudhon, compare Vincent 1984:87, 191. 
7 For relevant accounts see Trujillo 1967:134; Jutglar 1975:266; Trías Bejarano 1968:52, 59; Lacasta 
Zabalza 1984:258.  
8 Barcia discusses association and the rights of labour at length (1855b:47-49, 66-67, 76-78). Pi is vocal 
on the same matters, on profit-taking by non-workers, and on credit: (1982:206, 375-76, 388-90. He 
approves of the direct exchange of goods (1982:394). Eiras Roel provides an apt account of Democrat 
participation in debates about Socialism, correctly giving Castelar his dues on the right to strike and 
workers' co-operatives for consumption and insurance (1961:256). On Garrido, see Martínez Pastor 
1976:136-37; Aja 1976:68, 158-81. 
9 The adjective photographic is used in Alarcón's (hostile) review (1954b: 1780-82). 
10 Compare the account of left Progressive nationalist aesthetics in Ginger 1999:210-14. 
11 The point is made in Castelar 1858:4-5; Barcia 1855b:47-48, 172; Pi 1982:117-19, 136-38; Garrido 
1859-60 42-43, 207-09. See Aja 1976:42-58; Jutglar 1975:185-87; Llorca 1966:52; Vilches García 
2001:38; García Casanova 1982:94-96, 140-60, 174-75, 179, 181-84. 
12 Compare on the political philosophy of the 1830s and 1840s, Ginger 1999:47-93. 
13 See Aja 1976:61, 102; Jutglar 1975:161, 190, Trujillo 1967:99; Trías Bejarano 1968:59. 
14 Valera calls philosophical history a shaggy-dog story (1949:1429). See also Alarcón 1954b. For 
Campoamor the only law of history is the negation of such a law by free will (1855:97-103). On Valera's 
respectful distance from Hegelianism, see Lacasta Zabalza 1984:37.  
15 His political allegiances are considered in his 'Réplica a la contestación' (1966:331); and in his 
correspondence (1992:49, 91, 108). 
16 See also Lombardero 2002:196, 208. On Hegel, compare Rosen 1982. 
17 On Campoamor's racism see Lombardero 2002:197-99. On the laws of the Moderate Liberal 
governments,  see Cruz 2000:43-44. On the behaviour of Sartorius (Conde de San Luis), see Carr 
1982:245. 
18 The 1861 edition had already reached 15 volumes. I will cite the Discurso preliminar from this first 
long edition available to me, though it appears from the first edition of the first volume. The prologue 
provided for the latter will be cited from the 1852 edition. 
 34 
                                                                                                                                                                              
19 On the pressures on the Progressive left and the post-1848 split in the party, see Eiras Roel 1961:157-
61; Castro 2001:83-84. The early Democrat ideologue Baralt and his Transcendental Idealism are 
discussed in Millares Carlo 1969; Ginger 1999:71-73. 
20 Far from all Lucas paintings are signed or dated. I give the date without a question mark only where 
there is a date on the work itself, or where evidence for the date is overwhelming. Dates with a question 
mark are as given in catalogues: nothing is being suggested either in favour or against the dating provided 
there.  
21 The motif lies behind the title as well as some of the contents of Álvarez Junco's Mater dolorosa 
(2001). 
22 The market for popular novels is considered in Botrel 1996:41-42. 
23 The role of pastiche and imitation in Lucas has been much remarked on. See Gaya Nuño 1970; Calvo 
Serraller 1996: 45-53, 62; du Gué Tapier 1940:56; Crespo 2002:30; Santos Torroella, 1971:81. 
24 These paintings, along with El santero, El cazador, and the self-portrait are discussed in more detail in 
the author's 'Identity and Dissociation in the Mid-Nineteenth-Century Paintings of Eugenio Lucas and 
Some Then Contemporary Fiction' (in press). 
25 On Alenza's avoidance of moralising and judgement, see Torres González 1997:14. 
26 On Elbo see  Moreno Mendoza 1998. On Castellano, see Reyero & Freixa 1995:180. 
27 The lascivious aspect of Andalusian commercial art is discussed in Valdivieso  1998:43. 
28 On Fernández y González's life, see Benítez 1996:684-85. On Lucas's life and sales, see Arnáiz 1981:3-
34, 88, 99-138. 
